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In writing The Postcolonial Eye I was curious to see what reading can be when it 
works with difference rather than assimilating it. I was interested in the generative 
possibilities of a reading practice that attends to gaps, to the places where a text falls 
silent, the places where the reading cannot go on. In these extraordinary times when 
Indigenous literature, visual arts and performance are remaking the arts in Australia, it 
seems to me that the old critical practices can no longer hold, and rather than trying to 
recuperate Australian critical conventions I thought I would start from another 
premise altogether. The premise is that these startling, shimmering texts—novels, 
paintings, dance and so on—cannot be captured within Western modes of thought, 
and that some of their vital political and aesthetic work lies not in their powers to 
make Indigenous worlds visible and knowable to non-Indigenous readers, as 
conventional criticism has it, but in their powers to unsettle such readers’ assurance in 
their own powers to see and to know.  
 
So, I hoped that The Postcolonial Eye would be read as a book of experimental 
criticism, one that looks for ways to effect a shift in predominant Westernised reading 
practices—away from assured knowledge and towards uncertainty and doubt and the 
creativity that these might evoke. This is a kind of reading practice that is oriented not 
towards an accumulation of knowledge but towards a discovery of its limits; a 
practice in which a ‘white’ reader of Indigenous textuality discovers the places where 
assumptions of privilege and possession are closed off.  
 
Another reading 
 
My colleagues Anne Maxwell and Odette Kelada read the book very differently than I 
had hoped. There are many reasons why that might be so, including the limits of my 
own writing powers. But the book’s arguments cannot be tested and no proper debate 
can be opened up if basic premises are as misrepresented as they are in their review of 
it. Sometimes a vital word or two has been skipped over, a negative for instance 
which completely reverses the meaning they attribute, or a line of argument is 
foreshortened rather than letting it run into the next sentence or paragraph, and so on. 
There are too many of these to speak back to all of them, and anyway readers can go 
to the book and make up their own minds. There are two or three particular 
misrepresentations that make nonsense of the book, though, and I will take some time 
to speak to these.  
 
There is one point that I really take issue with, and this concerns what they find to be 
the book’s ‘almost obsessive insistence on sexual perversion and violation of 
Indigenous bodies’, due they suspect to the book’s psychoanalytic influences. I want 
to respond to this because it is an issue that extends way beyond any theoretical argy-
bargy about literary criticism, and into the regions of very contemporary Australian 
race politics. 
 
But first, what do these reviewers say about the reading practice I am proposing? 
They twice insist that I argue that reading can affect a change in the subject through 
an accumulation of knowledge. They even italicize their point for emphasis and are 
careful to specify page numbers where they say my claim can be found. When I turn 
to these pages, I find quite the opposite: 
 
This is to make a different point that the commonsense view of reading as 
changing the subject through the accumulation of knowledge. This is 
instead to describe a process whereby a reader sees differently rather than 
more. This reader, rather than simply acquiring more knowledge, 
relinquishes some of the objects of knowledge she previously held onto so 
dearly. (27) 
 
Their misrepresentation of my argument seriously affects the sense anyone could 
make of the book’s approach, because the notion of accumulation is so very foreign to 
the reading practices I am experimenting with.  
 
My starting point is that reading is a visual practice: it always involves a scene. I turn 
to theories of the visual to explore this, including Lacan’s theory of anamorphosis 
which emphasizes shifts in one’s powers to see. One does not see more when one 
moves positions in a visual field, one sees differently.  What is crucial here is that the 
shift does not involve accumulation but loss: one scene comes into view as another 
one falls. I work with the Lacanian notion of anamorphosis because it suggests 
incommensurability between visual fields. There is no one viewing position from 
which one can see all; and there are limits to the viewing positions that any one 
subject can occupy. For Lacan, vision has its radical, subjective limitations. If reading 
is a visual practice, then by extension it too has its limits. This book is about these 
limits. 
 
Bodies 
 
Elsewhere in their review, Maxwell and Kelada charge me with practising a kind of 
cultural tourism: that I propose relying on a non-Indigenous guide such as the art 
critic and anthropologist Jennifer Biddle to help me see the art of Emily Kame 
Kngwarreye. But if they had read just a little further, to the very next paragraph, they 
would have found that any hope for this kind of translation of Kngwarreye’s artistic 
vision by looking through a non-Indigenous perspective, however sophisticated, is 
expressly rejected.  
 
In talking about how non-Indigenous spectators see Indigenous art, I have been 
interested to revisit theories of embodiment that argue that bodies are made in cultural 
practices (Vicki Kirby). There is no universal or essential body. There is no appeal to 
a universal body of feeling either, and no universal power of vision. So, I do not share 
Jennifer Biddle’s faith that Emily Kame Kngwarreye’s art insists on a non-Indigenous 
viewer feeling their way to the painting via affect shared with the artist. I can, 
unfortunately, only see Emily Kame Kngwarreye’s art through my own body of 
feeling, made in western cultural practices (including the practice of western 
perspectival art).   
 
Through cultural practices, embodied subjects (or what Elizabeth Grosz calls psychic 
corporealities) are made and re-made. Reading might be one of these kinds of cultural 
practices. But the possibilities for change might not be of the order that would allow 
someone like myself for instance to see fully those objects of knowledge produced in 
Indigenous cultural practices. I doubt I could live long enough to so thoroughly re-
make my ‘psychic corporeality’ and the limits and possibilities of my capacities to 
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see, know, feel. What mindbody re-making would need to happen before I could see 
the donkey-devil that Paddy Roe speaks of, hear its hee-haw? Alexis Wright’s 
grandmother told her that a tree could act very strangely if it wanted to. It has taken 
Alexis Wright a lifetime, she says, to understand what this meant. How long it would 
take me, I cannot guess.  
 
And would the subject who desired to discover the limits of her own knowledge– 
forsaking some of its objects in the hope of coming to ways of seeing and knowing 
that would be so new to her—would this subject any longer be quite the ‘white 
subject’ she was when she started out? 
 
‘There is no white subject…’ 
 
Maxwell and Kelada are unable to decide whether I disavow whiteness or essentialise 
it, although I suspect these two possibilities cancel each other out. Either way, this is 
to misrepresent the way the book works with theories of whiteness as performative. 
 
When whiteness is taken to be performative, it is seen not as something one has or is. 
There is no recourse to essentialising discourses of genetics, say, or to the colour of 
one’s skin or hair.  Instead whiteness is taken to be a racist idea, or ideal, and like all 
ideals, it cannot be possessed. Subjects might approximate ideals, they might 
approach them, but it a fantasy to think one ever arrives at an ideal. One never grasps 
it; one never possesses an ideal or fully occupies its place.  
 
Instead, ‘whites’ are taken to be those subjects who have been interpellated into 
whiteness’s regime; they have answered its call. They are the subjects who desire to 
be white and who can successfully negotiate a position in proximity to its ideals. They 
are the subjects who believe they possess whiteness, and on these fantasmatic grounds 
demand to be accorded its privileges. In the book I suggest the clumsy neologism—
‘the-subject-who-desires-to-be-white’—in place of ‘the white subject’ not because I 
disavow whiteness but in order to foreground interpellation and performativity. A 
theory of the performativity of whiteness does not disavow whiteness but insists on its 
devastating effects, what after Judith Butler could be called its killing ideals. 
 
Overall, there is in Maxwell and Kelada’s reading of the book a refusal to travel very 
far with its ideas; a refusal, it seems to me, to be moved. My own efforts at working 
with these ideas, the places where I have tried to put doubt and uncertainty into effect 
and where I take up an ironic attitude to my own ‘white’ authority, these all pretty 
much disappear in the reading they present here. Even my choice of the book’s title is 
not allowed any deliberate ambiguity despite that postcolonialism is critiqued at the 
outset of the book, and my own eye is always implicated in the field of vision that I 
am trying to describe. I am, these critics imply, narcissistic when I use the first 
personal pronoun, and universalising and essentialist when I use the second person 
plural. And so on. The book is held to have promise, to be ‘potentially even 
groundbreaking’, but I cannot find anything in the review that actually refers to what 
it is about the book that could be said to shift the ground of contemporary criticism. 
 
Perversion or disavowal, again? 
For Maxwell and Kelada there is in the book an obsessive insistence on ‘white’ men 
and women’s sexual perversion and their violation of Indigenous bodies, attributed to 
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psychoanalysis’s influence. But by far the greatest influence on my thinking has been 
the accounts of ‘white’ perversion given by Indigenous men and women themselves. 
It was Ruth Hegarty’s account of her childhood at Cherbourg that brought me to see 
the acts of some missionaries and supervisors of Aboriginal settlements as being 
based in sadistic pleasure; Alexis Wright’s writings, too, on the rape of girls and of 
women tied to trees, Kim Scott’s accounts of unspeakable violations of women and 
children, and so on. These are stories that should bring the country down. The 
Postcolonial Eye does insist on them, and tries to find ways of pointing to them 
without merely repeating the violence of re-presentation. This is one of the ethical 
questions the book explicitly grapples with.  
 
But that word ‘obsessive’ implies that my insistence is too much. There is a whole 
book to write in answer to that, but instead I would ask a reader to turn to the writings 
of Ruth Hegarty, Alexis Wright, Kim Scott and many others. How to bear what is 
there, written on the page: how to go on reading? 
 
Alison Ravenscroft, La Trobe University 
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